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State v. Sampson

156 Utah Adv. Rep. 4
the cases cited by the state are readily distinguish- ations of the Miranda rule which are not deemed
able in that no case involves two sets of Miranda constitutional in dimension. We have already held in
warnings-the first followed by an equivocal evaluating the state's Elstad argument that the viorequest for counsel and the second followed by lation of defendant's right to counsel was of consapparent waiver~as is the case before us. The titutional dimension and not merely a violation of
cases, with the exception of Martin which we treat Miranda.
more fully in the text, instead involve some variaEvidence obtained in violation of the Fifth Ametion on the Elstad theme-statements made ndment is properly suppressed under the fruit of the
without Miranda warnings, followed by Miranda poisonous tree doctrine. Sampson, 143 Utah Adv.
warnings, waiver, and further statements.
Rep. at 18. See, e.g., Shea v. Louisiana, 470 U.S.
The state additionally cites, in a letter submitted 51, 52 (1985) (interrogation subsequent to request
after argument on the petition for rehearing, Sfafe for counsel violates Fifth Amendment). See also Nix
v. Christoffcrson, 793 P.2d 944 (Utah Ct. App. v. Williams, 467 U.S. 431, 442 & n.3 (1984). While
1990), claiming that this court there "held that [aj we are not ignorant of the obstacles which the state
second set [of warnings) served as a clarification of will face in presenting a case on remand without
the equivocal request/ We do not read Christoffc- evidence of the body absent the applicability of
rson this way. The police officers in Christofferson some exception to the exclusionary rule, see Sampson,
apparently ceased questioning after the equivocal 143 Utah Adv. Rep. at 18 & n.19, the
request for counsel, and proceeded to clarify the derivative evidence of the child's body was obtained
defendant's equivocal request. Once they did so and as a direct result of interrogation that was improper
learned that the defendant did not desire counsel, as a matter of constitutional law, and must, absent
the officers continued interrogation. Id. at 947. We some exception, be suppressed. We are not enthushesitate to read the decision as equating a mere iastic about the obstacles our decision will create to
second administration of Miranda warnings, even if securing defendant's conviction on retrial. But we
no Miranda rights were then invoked, with definitive are unwilling to sidestep important constitutional
clarification of an equivocal request for counsel. safeguards to assuage the frustrations that inhere in
Such an important and far-reaching conclusion retrying a defendant clearly guilty of such a heinous
would surely have been accompanied by lengthy crime. See Nix v. Williams, 467 U.S." at 442.
discussion and analysis, which is not to be found in
the opinion, and is at odds with language in the
opinion noting that clarifying questions were asked
prior to proceeding with a second set of warnings
Cite as
and further interrogation. See id.
156 Utah Adv. Rep. 8
6. The state's proffered analysis is further flawed in
that the bright-line rule of Edwards, cited in Minnick
IN T H E
v. Mississippi for "clarity of its command"
U T A H COURT OF A P P E A L S
and "certainty of its application," 111 S.Ct. at 490,
would be undermined if courts were required to
receive evidence pertaining to the lack of coercion STATE of Utah,
attending an equivocal voluntariness of waiver of
Plaintiff and Appellee,
the request for counsel. In addition to breeding
v.
contempt for a cherished constitutional right, sign- Louie Edwin SIMS,
ificant judicial resources would be needlessly expeDefendant and Appellant.
nded, a result clearly eschewed in Edwards and its
progeny.
No. 890463-CA
7. Insofar as Martin*s view of an analogy between
an equivocal invocation of the right to remain silent FILED: March 15, 1991
and an equivocal request for counsel might suggest
otherwise, we reject that view. Cf. Robcrson, 486 Fourth District, Juab County
U.S. at 683 (emphasizing distinction between exer- Honorable George E. Ballif
cise of right to terminate interrogation and remain ATTORNEYS:
silent and right to counsel).
8. The state also argues that even if defendant's G. Fred Metos, Salt Lake City, for Appellant
statements must be suppressed, the derivative phys- R. Paul Van Dam and Dan R. Larsen, Salt
ical evidence, chiefly the victim's body, would be
Lake City, for Appellee
properly admitted, presumably by way of photographs and descriptive testimony. The state proceeds Before Judges Greenwood, Jackson, and '
upon the assumption that the interrogation subseq- Orme.
uent to defendant's equivocal reference to counsel,
concededly a violation of the Miranda rule, was
OPINION
merely technically defective, not constitutionally
infirm. The state calls our attention to several deci- GREENWOOD, Judge:
sions in which other courts have allowed the admiLouie Edwin Sims appeals his conviction of
ssion of derivative evidence obtained subsequent to
interrogation conducted in violation of the technical possession of a controlled substance with
rules of Miranda. See, e.g., United States v. Patte- intent to distribute for value, Utah Code Ann.
rson, 812 F.2d 1188 (9th Cir. 1987), cert, denied, §58-37-8(l)(a)(i) (Supp. 1988), a second
485 U.S. 922 (1988); In re Owen F., 70 Md. App. degree felony. Sims claims the stop of his
678, 523 A.2d 627, cert, denied, 310 Md. 275, 528 vehicle in a roadblock conducted by the Utah
A.2d 1286 (1987); Sfare v. Wethercd, 110 Wash. 2d
466, 755 P.2d 797 (1988). We find the cases cited by Highway Patrol was an unreasonable seizure
the state to be inapplicable, as each addresses violUTAH ADVA
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under the fourth amendment to the United
States Constitution and under article I, section
14 of the Utah Constitution.
Following oral argument, three cases relevant to the issues presented in this appeal were
decided. Those cases are Michigan Dcp't of
State Police v. Sitz, __U.S , 110 S.Ct. 2481
(1990); State v. Larocco, 794 P.2d 460 (Utah
1990); and State v. Arroyo, 796 P.2d 684
(Utah 1990). Accordingly, we granted Sims'
motion for supplemental briefing. Having
considered the supplemental briefs, we now
reverse his conviction, and remand for a new
trial in which evidence seized from Sims'
vehicle is to be suppressed.
FACTS
On the morning of July 27, 1988, officers
from the Utah Highway Patrol and Juab
County Sheriffs Office conducted a roadblock on Interstate Highway 15 approximately
two miles south of Nephi, Utah. The roadblock was planned and supervised by Utah
Highway Patrol Sergeant Paul Mangelson.1 Its
purpose was to detect driver's license, automobile registration, and equipment violations,
as well as liquor and drug violations. Notice
that the roadblock would take place was
published in the Juab County Times News two
to four weeks prior to the roadblock. There
was no evidence that the News was distributed
outside of Juab County. Interstate 15 is a
major north-south route and link between
Salt Lake City, Utah and Los Angeles, California.
According to Mangelson, no written policy,
from the Highway Patrol or from any other
source, existed to guide the conduct of the
roadblock in question. Mangelson indicated
that his supervising lieutenant had given him
permission to conduct the roadblock.
The roadblock was staffed by about ten
uniformed officers. A series of three signs
within a one-half mile distance directed
drivers to the roadblock, marked by orange
cones. Large trucks were not stopped, because
stopping them might cause hazardous traffic
congestion. Sergeant Mangelson instructed
officers to inspect driver's licenses and vehicle
registration of the stopped motorists; while
doing this, they were to watch for signs of
liquor and drug violations. Officers could hold
vehicles for further investigation if the initial
contact raised questions. One of the officers,
Trooper Carl Howard, indicated that his
practice also included asking all drivers, regardless of suspicion, if they had alcohol,
weapons, or contraband in their vehicles.2
At approximately 9:00 a.m., Sims' vehicle,
a Chrysler sedan, was stopped at the roadblock. Trooper Howard, the first officer to
contact Sims, saw nothing to cause him to
suspect a violation of the law as Sims' vehicle
approached. 3 Howard asked for Sims'
driver's license and vehicle registration. Sims

produced a valid Georgia driver's license and
a Utah registration in his name. In response to
the trooper's question, Sims stated that he
was en route from Los Angeles to Salt Lake
City. While talking with Sims, Trooper
Howard smelled alcohol inside the sedan and
saw an "open" liquor bottle in the back seat
area. He asked Sims if there were any alcohol,
weapons, or drugs in the vehicle. Sims admitted that there was alcohol in the vehicle, but
denied carrying drugs or weapons.
Howard then asked Sims to exit the sedan,
and asked for consent to look inside. Sims
consented. Sergeant Mangelson approached
and helped Howard search the car's interior.
They discovered the remnants of one or two
marijuana cigarettes in the right rear passenger
door ashtray. Howard then asked Sims if he
would mind if they searched the trunk of the
sedan. Sims agreed and opened the trunk.
Mangelson searched the trunk while Howard
conducted field sobriety tests on Sims nearby.
In a suitcase in the trunk, Mangelson discovered two small plastic bags containing
marijuana. Sims, becoming visibly nervous,
then stated that he wanted the search stopped.
Mangelson told Sims that, based on the discovery of marijuana, he had probable cause to
continue searching the trunk. Looking in the
spare tire well, Mangelson found a kilogram
brick of cocaine. Sims was then arrested for
driving under the influence of alcohol and
possession of a controlled substance.
Before trial, Sims filed a motion to suppress
all evidence seized from his vehicle, contending that the roadblock stop was an unlawful
seizure under the Utah and federal constitutions and that the officers lacked probable
cause to search the trunk. Following an evidentiary hearing, the trial court denied Sims'
motion. The court determined that (1) the
roadblock stop did not violate the Utah or
federal constitutions; (2) Sims voluntarily
consented to the search of the vehicle, including the trunk; and (3) Sergeant Mangelson
had probable cause to continue searching the
trunk after Sims' withdrawal of consent.
Based on the evidence presented at the suppression hearing and on the parties' written
stipulation to the evidence, the trial court
found Sims guilty of possession of a controlled substance with intent to distribute.
ISSUES
On appeal, Sims argues that (1) the roadblock stop of his vehicle violated his right to be
free from unreasonable searches and seizures
under article I, section 14 of the Utah Constitution and the fourth amendment to the
United States Constitution; and (2) there was
insufficient attenuation between the unlawful
detention and any consent to overcome the
illegality of the roadblock.
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CONSTITUTIONALITY OF ROADBLOCK
Sims' first point on appeal deals solely with
the permissibility of the roadblock itself.
Because it is undisputed that the roadblock
was conducted with neither a warrant nor
suspicion of wrongdoing by Sims, and that no
emergency situation necessitated it, the question of whether the roadblock was improper is
reduced to one of law, and we review it
without deference to the trial court. Scharf v.
BMG Corp., 700 P.2d 1068, 1070 (Utah 1985);
State v. Serpente, 768 P.2d 994, 995 (Utah Ct.
App. 1989).
The State neither contests nor accepts Sims'
arguments that the roadblock violated the
fourth amendment to the United States Constitution and article I, section 14 of the Utah
Constitution. Rather, the State invites us to
decide this case solely on the basis of the attenuation issue. That is, we are to "assum[e]
arguendo that the stop was illegal/ and
remand this case for fact finding on whether
Sims' consent to search his vehicle was obtained through exploitation of the stop.
We believe it inappropriate in this case,
however, to simply assume that the roadblock
was unconstitutional, without analysis. Sims
has steadfastly and thoroughly argued the
unconstitutionality of the roadblock, on both
federal and state grounds, throughout these
proceedings.4 The transcript of the suppression
hearing and the trial court's written findings
on the issue provide an ample factual record
from which we can assess the constitutionality
of this roadblock. The issue, therefore, has
been properly preserved and squarely presented on appeal.
We are aware of the rule that we should
avoid addressing constitutional issues unless
required to do so. State v. Anderson, 701 P.2d
1099, 1103 (Utah 1985). This roadblock,
however, was not an isolated incident, and our
police may continue to use suspicionless roadblocks as a law enforcement tool.5 This
makes all Utah motorists subject to closer
police scrutiny than they might expect or,
arguably, be legitimately required to encounter.
The right of citizens to be secure from
unreasonable seizures "shall not be violated."
U.S. Const, amend. IV; Utah Const, art. I,
§14 (emphasis added). A roadblock or motorist "checkpoint" is a seizure under the
fourth amendment, Michigan Dep't of State
Police v. Sitz, _U.S.__, 110 S.Ct. 2481, 2485
(1990); State v. Talbot, 792 P.2d 489, 491
(Utah Ct. App. 1990); there is no reason to
hold otherwise with respect to our state constitution. For the benefit of our citizens, as well
as that of police charged with enforcing our
laws, it behooves us to decide whether the
roadblock that netted Sims was constitutionally permissible. We hold that it was not.
Statutory Authority to Conduct Roadblocks.

C O D E • Co
Provo, Utah

A prelude to the constitutional analysis per
se is a determination of whether any statutory
authority either permits or prohibits roadblocks of the sort conducted here, that is, a
suspicionless, investigatory roadblock in which
vehicles and drivers are screened for possible
violations of law.* We note several statutes of
interest, but none apply here.
The Utah Department of Transportation
operates ports of entry at which all large
vehicles and vehicles transporting livestock are
stopped and inspected for, among other
things, driver qualifications, registration, tax
payments, size and weight, and safety. Utah
Code Ann. §27-12-19 (Supp. 1990). Our
fish and game laws give the Division of Wildlife authority to conduct roadblocks or game
checking stations under Utah Code Ann. §2320-19 (1984), which makes it unlawful to fail
to stop at such stations. These provisions are
obviously inapplicable here.
We also note that the Utah Highway Patrol
is charged with the duty of "regulat[ing]
traffic on all highways and roads of the
state." Utah Code Ann. §27-10-4(l)(b)
(1989). This provision might authorize roadblock-type operations at, for example, accident scenes, or where hazardous road or
traffic conditions require extra control.
However, because this section in no way
implies authority to conduct investigatory
operations, it does not apply here.
Utah Code Ann. §77-7-15 (1990) allows
a peace officer to "stop any person in a public
place when he has a reasonable suspicion to
believe he has committed or is in the act of
committing or is attempting to commit a
public offense and may demand his name,
address and an explanation of his actions."7
Similarly, Utah Code Ann. §41-l-17(c)
(1988) requires officers to stop a vehicle for
driver's license, registration, and general inspection "upon reasonable belief that any
vehicle is being operated in violation of any
provision of this act or of any other law regulating the operation of vehicles ...." These
codifications of the familiar "reasonable suspicion" standard of Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1
(1968), were clearly not enacted with roadblock-type stops in mind; rather, they apply to
the singling out of particular individuals or
vehicles by the police, based on particularized
suspicion.
We find nothing in the Utah code that
specifically prohibits the roadblock that was
conducted here, however. Therefore, we query
whether the roadblock was constitutionally
prohibited.
Fourth Amendment.
In Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648 (1979),
the United States Supreme Court implied that
roadblock stops for the purpose of checking
driver's licenses and vehicle registrations
might be constitutionally permitted. Holding
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that a routine stop of an individual vehicle for
such purpose, without articulable individualized suspicion of wrongdoing, was impermissible under the fourth amendment, the Court
commented that "(t]his holding does not preclude the State of Delaware or other States
from developing methods for spot checks that
involve less intrusion or that do not involve
the unconstrained exercise of discretion.
Questioning of all oncoming traffic at roadblock-type stops is one possible alternative." Id.
at 663.
The Prouse dictum fell on receptive ears,
and in S/rz, the Court considered an investigatory roadblock, a "sobriety checkpoint,"
operated by the Michigan State Police Department. The checkpoint was operated under
guidelines created by a special state advisory
committee composed of law enforcement
officials and transportation researchers from
the University of Michigan. Those guidelines
governed checkpoint publicity, site selection,
and police procedure at the checkpoint itself.
Sitz, 110 S.Ct. at 2483-84.
Under the guidelines, all motorists traveling
through the checkpoint were stopped and
briefly checked for intoxication. Only if the
initial examination revealed signs of intoxication would a motorist would be directed out
of the traffic flow for a driver's license and
registration check and further sobriety tests.
The Sitz checkpoint was maintained for one
hour and fifteen minutes. During that time,
126 vehicles were stopped for an average of
twenty-five seconds each. The checkpoint
yielded two arrests-approximately one and
one-half percent of stopped drivers-for
driving under the influence. Id. at 2484.
Utilizing a balancing test developed in United

States

v. Martinez-Fuerte,

428 U.S.

543 (1976) and Brown v. Texas, 443 U.S. 47
(1979), the Supreme Court held that Michigan's sobriety checkpoint passed fourth
amendment muster. The brief detention of
motorists at the checkpoint was found to be
only a "slight" infringement of their fourth
amendment interests. Sitz, 110 S.Ct. at 2486.
Outweighing this infringement were "the
magnitude of the drunken driving problem
[and] the States' interest in eradicating it," id.
at 2485, along with the Court's assessment
that the one and one-half percent drunk
driver arrest rate demonstrated that the checkpoint adequately advanced that interest. Id.
at 2487-88; see also Brown, 443 U.S. at 5051 and cases cited therein (permissibility of
non-arrest seizure requires weighing public
interest served thereby, degree to which it
serves the interest, and severity of interference
with individual liberty).
According to the testimony of Sergeant
Mangelson and Trooper Howard, the roadblock in the present case was of an "allpurpose" variety. All vehicles except trucks
were checked for licenses, registration, equi-

11

pment problems, driver sobriety, and signs of
illicit drugs, without any suspicion of wrongdoing. The trial court, focusing on the last
purpose, performed a balancing test as described above. It held that "a history of escalating drug traffic along this stretch of Interstate
15 as a result of other arrests, tends to legitimize the public interest in predetermined check
points, systematically pursued by officers to
minimize the burden to individual citizens
without discretion to engage in random roving
stops."8 Without passing judgment on the
accuracy of the trial court's balancing, we
believe that analysis was premature and therefore erroneous.
As we read Sitz, Martinez-Fuerte, and Brown,
a fourth amendment balancing test
applies to warrantless seizures that, if not
based upon articulable suspicion of an individual, "must be carried out pursuant to a plan
embodying explicit, neutral limitations on the
conduct of individual officers." Brown, 443
U.S. at 51 (emphasis added). Additionally,
such a plan should be developed by
"politically accountable officials" with a
"unique understanding of, and a responsibility
for, limited, public resources, including a finite
number of police officers." Sitz, 110 S.Ct at
2487. Those officials, and not the courts, are
responsible for performing the initial balancing between the fourth amendment and the
interests served by the plan. Id. While the Sitz
sobriety checkpoint met these requirements,
the roadblock used here did not.
No explicit plan, beyond a determination
that all vehicles other than large trucks were to
be stopped, governed this roadblock.9 Nor
does it appear that Sergeant Mangelson or the
lieutenant who gave him permission to
conduct the roadblock are politically accountable officials as contemplated in Sitz.10 The
process by which the roadblock was authorized also lacked features of political accountability that were arguably present in Sitr. the
Sitz roadblock was authorized pursuant to
careful advance study that included nonpolice public officials, while authority for this
roadblock arose solely within a police agency.
Finally, there is no indication that the authorization process here involved any balancing of
fourth amendment interests and law enforcement interests, or an assessment of the effectiveness of the roadblock in meeting those
interests. Instead, the lack of any written
guidelines arising from the authorization
process strongly suggests that no such analysis
took place.
The requirement of explicit guidelines,
developed in a politically accountable manner
that includes balancing of the relevant concerns, is, under Sitz, a prerequisite to any
judicial balancing analysis of a suspicionless
roadblock. 11 After-the-fact judicial balancing of the interests implicated by such a
roadblock cannot make it constitutionally
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proper. Therefore, we hold that the roadblock
in which Sims was detained violated the fourth
amendment to the United States Constitution.12
Utah Constitution Article I, Section 14.
The Sitz emphasis on roadblock guidelines
stresses the principle that when police operations interfere with fourth amendment interests, "the discretion of the official in the field
[must] be circumscribed, at least to some
extent." Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648,
661 (1979) (citations omitted). Sitz implicitly
places both guideline development and the
decision to utilize suspicionless roadblocks in
the first place in the hands of "politically
accountable" officials. We view roadblock
authorization and guideline development as
separate steps, however. The initial decision to
permit suspicionless roadblocks is especially
critical, and requires a higher degree of political accountability than the guideline development step. Sims argues that the lack of statutory authority renders suspicionless roadblocks improper under the Utah Constitution.
As regards the initial authority to permit such
roadblocks, we agree.
Article I, section 14 of the Utah Constitution is virtually identical to the fourth amendment. Like its federal counterpart, it consists
of a "reasonableness" clause and a "warrant"
clause:
The right of the people to be secure
in their persons, houses, papers and
effects against unreasonable searches and seizures shall not be violated; and no warrant shall issue but
upon probable cause supported by
oath or affirmation, particularly
describing the place to be searched,
and the person or thing to be
seized.
In State v. Larocco, 794 P.2d 460 (Utah
1990), the Utah Supreme Court, decrying the
United States Supreme Court's "vacillation
between the warrant approach and the reasonableness approach" regarding automobile
searches, id. at 469, reaffirmed its commitment to the warrant approach under our
constitution, stating that " [warrantless searches and seizures are per se unreasonable
unless exigent circumstances require action
before a warrant can be obtained." Id. at 470
(quoting State v. Christensen, 676 P.2d 408,
411 (Utah 1984)).
In Larocco, a car theft suspect's expectation
of privacy in the interior of the subject car,
parked unattended and unlocked on a public
street, triggered the application of article I,
section 14. 794 P.2d at 468-69. Police officers' warrantless opening of the car's door to
view the vehicle identification number on the
doorjamb was found to constitute a search
subject to the fourth amendment's warrant
requirement. The search was then held imprUTAH

oper under article I, section 14, because there
was no threat that the car would disappear
before a warrant could be obtained to look
inside it. The court held that such "exigent
circumstances" to support a warrantless search
did not exist where the car was not en route
away from the officers* jurisdiction and the
suspect had not been alerted to police interest
in it. Id. at 470-71.
Under article I, section 14 our supreme
court applies a "warrants whenever possible"
policy to motor vehicle searches and seizures.
Id. This policy is consistent with one fundamental purpose of constitutional search and
seizure limits: the interposition of neutral
authority between police seeking evidence of
crimes and the citizens from whom such evidence is sought.13
In the usual non-exigent circumstances
search and seizure scenario, the judicial
branch, through a magistrate, serves as the
neutral authority that issues or denies a
warrant to perform a search or seizure. The
warrant is issued only when probable cause
exists. U.S. Const, amend. IV; Utah Const,
art. I, §14. Our state legislature, however,
has also served as a neutral authority between
our police and our citizens, in authorizing
certain seizures upon less than probable cause.
As already noted, our legislature has followed the courts' lead in authorizing brief
warrantless stops of individuals and motor
vehicles based on reasonable suspicion.14 Also
as noted, the legislature has acted independently in authorizing ports of entry, as well as
fish and game checkpoints. These operations,
supported by neither warrants nor any level of
individualized suspicion, clearly implicate
article I, section 14 of our constitution.
From an operational standpoint, ports of
entry and fish and game checkpoints closely
resemble the roadblock that was conducted in
this case, in that all large trucks, or all vehicles used by hunters, respectively, are submitted to official inspections. However, in authorizing these operations, our legislature has,
presumably, weighed the need for such suspicionless inspections against their intrusion
upon individual liberty,15 a process analogous
to that performed by a magistrate in the issuance of a warrant. A high degree of political
accountability for the institution of these
practices can also be presumed, in that representatives of truckers, hunters, law enforcement, and the citizenry at large all very likely
played a part in passing the relevant statutes.
In each case of legislation authorizing specific types of checkpoints or stops of persons
or vehicles, with or without individualized
suspicion of wrongdoing, the citizens of this
state have acted through their elected representatives. Therefore, the collective will of the
people is expressed and, furthermore, the
people have notice of duly authorized police
activity.
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In stark contrast, the roadblock conducted
in this case was authorized solely by police
officers, the very people whose behavior
article I, section 14 is intended to limit. No
non-law enforcement officials took part in
the decision to set up the roadblock. Leaving
the initial decision to conduct such operations
in police hands creates a scheme that is both
unrealistic and constitutionally untenable.
We believe that legislative authorization of
ports of entry and fish and game checkpoints,
like the issuance of a judicial warrant, triggers
at least some presumption that these law enforcement practices are constitutionally permissible. Because the roadblock in this case had
neither form of authorization, it was entitled
to no such presumption. Both warrants and
statutes originate outside the executive branch,
serving to check abuses of that branch's law
enforcement power. Consistent with our
supreme court's emphasis on the warrant
requirement, then, we hold that suspicionless,
investigatory motor vehicle roadblocks, conducted without legislative authorization, are
per se unconstitutional under article I, section
14 of the Utah Constitution.
In requiring legislative authority as a prerequisite to the use of suspicionless investigatory roadblocks, we join two other western
states that have similarly construed their constitutions. See, e.g., State v. Henderson, 114
Idaho 293, 756 P.2d 1057 (1988); Nelson v.
Lane County, 304 Or. 97, 743 P.2d 692
(1987).16 At least one other state has established the same standard under the fourth
amendment. State v. Smith, 674 P.2d 562
(Okla. App. 1984). This approach is particularly appropriate where a proposed police
practice will, as here, affect everyone travelling our state's highways. Because of its close
ties to the citizens whose rights will be affected, the minimum necessary political accountability for such practices lies, at the outset,
with our legislature.
Our holding that article I, section 14 prohibits suspicionless investigative roadblocks
without legislative authority, in effect, requires
the legislature to perform the S/fz-type balancing function if and when it decides to
consider the authorization of such roadblocks.
Judicial balancing of the interests implicated
by such roadblocks, then, will need to occur
only if and when the legislature, upon performing such balancing itself, decides to authorize them.17 We, unlike our colleague in his
concurring opinion, prefer that the legislature
announce its view of public policy and the
philosophy of Utah's citizenry as regards
roadblocks, prior to the court applying constitutional analysis to the legislature's product.18
We also emphasize that our holding on the
state constitutionality of the roadblock in
which Sims was stopped is limited in its application to similar, non-emergency situations.

13

It is not intended to apply to emergency roadblocks that might, for example, be used to
apprehend a fleeing felon. Nor do we intend
to impede any existing authority to conduct
roadblocks for traffic control purposes. Any
constitutional challenge to these types of
traffic stops awaits another day. It is the suspicionless, investigative, non-emergency
roadblock, conducted in the absence of legislative authority, that we hold to be unconstitutional.
ATTENUATION OF CONSENT FROM
ILLEGAL ROADBLOCK
Sims argues that there was insufficient attenuation between his detention and the consent
he gave to search his vehicle to purge the taint of
the illegality of the detention. He does not claim
that his consent was coerced from him and was
therefore involuntary. Rather, he argues that
because there were no intervening circumstances
between the detention and the consent, the consent was the fruit of the illegal detention, and,
therefore, evidence seized pursuant to his consent should have been ordered suppressed. Sims
did not make this argument in the trial court.
Normally, "where a defendant fails to assert
a particular ground for suppressing unlawfully
obtained evidence in the trial court, an appellate court will not consider that ground on
appeal." State v. Carter, 707 P.2d 656, 660
(Utah 1985); see also State v. Webb, 790 P.2d
65, 71 n.2 (Utah Ct. App. 1990); Utah R.
Crim. P. 12. Unless a ground for suppression
is "unknown or unavailable" to a defendant at
the time a suppression motion is filed, the
right to challenge the admission of evidence on
that ground is waived. State v. Lee, 633 P.2d
48, 53 (Utah 1981). Here, however, because
our then-standing decisions effectively held
that a non-coerced search consent, by itself,
purged the taint of a primary illegality, Sims'
non-attenuation argument was unavailable to
him in the trial court and would have been
pointless to assert. See State v. Sierra, 754
P.2d 972, 980 (Utah Ct. App. 1988). Therefore, it is proper to address that argument
now.
In State v. Arroyo, 796 P.2d 684 (Utah
1990), the Utah Supreme Court, reversing this
court's holding in State v. Arroyo, 770 P.2d
153, 155-56 (Utah Ct. App. 1989), held that,
to be constitutionally valid, a search consent
following illegal police behavior must be both
noncoerced and not arrived at by exploitation
of the primary police illegality. Factors used to
evaluate the non-exploitation or attenuation
element are derived from Brown v. Illinois,
All U.S. 590 (1975), which involved a confession obtained from a criminal suspect after
his illegal arrest. They include the temporal
proximity of the primary illegality and the
granting of consent, the presence or absence
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of intervening circumstances, and the purpose
and flagrancy of the illegal police conduct. Arroyo, 796 P.2d at 690-91 n.4 (citing Brown, All
U.S. at 603-04, and 3 W. LaFave, Search and
Seizure §8.2(d), at 193-94 (2d ed. 1987)).
The Arroyo case was remanded to the trial
court for fact finding on the issue of whether
the defendant's consent to search his vehicle
was attenuated from or an exploitation of his
illegal stop. Because the burden is on the State
to show that evidence obtained following
illegal police conduct is attenuated from the
illegality, Brown, All U.S. at 604, and because
the attenuation issue was not presented to the
trial court, a remand to examine the attenuation factors has been suggested here. We find,
however, that the record now before us contains "sufficient detail and depth" to allow us
to determine the issue as a matter of law. See id.
Regarding the temporal proximity factor,
the record demonstrates a very short time span
between Sims' stop in the roadblock and
Trooper Howard's request to search his automobile. The trooper had but a brief conversation with Sims, regarding his license and
registration, his trip itinerary, and possession
of alcohol, guns, or contraband, before asking
for consent to search his car. The consent was
obtained within minutes of the illegal stop,
and not even under our clear error standard of
review could the trial court find enough time
between the stop and the grant of consent to
attenuate the relationship between the two. 19
Nor does the record reveal any possibility of
intervening circumstances between the illegal
stop and Sims' grant of consent to the search.
Such circumstances must be independent of
the primary illegality. Arroyo, 796 P.2d at 69091. Here, Trooper Howard's request for
consent to search Sims' sedan was based upon
the smell of alcohol, the sight of the open
liquor bottle in the sedan, and Sims' admission, uneventful since the bottle was in
obvious view, that he was carrying alcohol.
Howard's opportunity to make these observations and to question Sims, however, depended entirely on the illegal roadblock. Neither
Sims' driving nor the external appearance of
his vehicle justified stopping him. Nothing
occurred which could have reasonably made
him feel free to proceed on his journey at any
time between the moment of his stop and the
discoveries that prompted the trooper's
request for consent to search his vehicle.20
Sims did not spontaneously volunteer his
consent, but gave it only when asked. Sims'
consent, then, arose from an unbroken chain
of events that began with the illegal roadblock.
The final factor in the attenuation analysis
is an examination of the purpose and flagrancy of the primary police illegality. Here, this
factor, unlike the first two, appears unrelated

CODE• CO
Provo, Utah

to the question of whether a search consent
flowed from, i.e., was an exploitation of, the
illegal police conduct.21 Instead, it appears to
be an alternative approach, inviting us to
overlook unconstitutional police conduct that
serves good purposes and is not too flagrant.
Troopers Howard and Mangelson testified
at some length about their expertise in drug
interdiction, and the trial court treated the
roadblock as if that was its primary purpose.
However noble this purpose might be, it was
pursued by an unauthorized means. The troopers each had years of law enforcement
experience, and can properly be charged with
awareness that their action was not authorized
by law. "The greatest dangers to liberty lurk in
insidious encroachment by men of zeal, wellmeaning but without understanding." Olmstead v. United States, 111 U.S. 438, 479 (1928)
(Brandeis, J., dissenting). Using ten to twelve
law officers to staff the roadblock may have
also left distant parts of the largely rural jurisdiction with delayed police assistance in the
event of need. Thus, although it does not
appear that the officers behaved abusively
toward those stopped at the roadblock, this
does not correct the constitutional violation.
In sum, the record demonstrates that Sims'
consent to search his vehicle was arrived at by
exploitation of the illegal roadblock. Accordingly, that consent was invalid. Because the
exclusionary rule applies to violations of both
the fourth amendment and article I, section 14
of the Utah Constitution, State v. Larocco,
794 P.2d 460, 471-73 (Utah 1990), all evidence obtained under that consent must be
suppressed.
PROBABLE CAUSE TO CONTINUE
SEARCH
Troopers Howard and Mangelson believed
that the discovery of marijuana in Sims' sedan
under the consent search gave them probable
cause to continue searching after consent was
withdrawn. However, because the initial
consent was invalid, any probable cause found
while searching under that consent was also
invalid. Absent probable cause to search the
sedan without Sims' consent, we need not
reach the issue of whether exigent circumstances existed to make the warrant requirement
inapplicable.
CONCLUSION
Sims' conviction for possession of a controlled substance with intent to distribute is
reversed, and the case is remanded to the trial
court for proceedings in accord with this
opinion.
Pamela T. Greenwood, Judge
I CONCUR:
Norman H. Jackson, Judge
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ORME, J. (concurring specially):
While I otherwise concur fully in the court's
opinion, 1 have two difficulties with the discussion treating the roadblock under article I,
section 14, of the Utah Constitution. First, if
the roadblock cannot even be validated under
the questionable "balancing" approach of
Michigan v. Sitz, 110 S.Ct. 2481 (1990), see,
e.g., id. at 2490-99 (Stevens, J., dissenting),
we have no need to examine whether it might
be additionally invalid under the state constitution. Second, and more importantly, I am
not enthusiastic about suggesting that the
legislature, any more than the courts or the
police, should be about the business of balancing away important constitutional protections that safeguard all of us so that law enforcement can more readily catch an occasional
law-breaker. The citizen's right to be free
from police intrusion in the total absence of
even the least suspicion of wrong-doing
should simply not be at the mercy of the legislature's determination of how tourism or our
hopes for the Olympics might somehow be
adversely impacted by one law enforcement
technique or another.
If it were necessary to reach the state constitutional issue in this case, i.e., if the roadblock passed muster under the federal constitution, I would be more inclined to solidify
longstanding constitutional precepts as at the
core of article I, section 14, than to borrow
the troublesome "balancing" approach embraced in Sitz, adopt some variation of that
approach, and begin a journey down that
nebulous path. Cf. State v. Larocco, 794 P.2d
460, 469 (Utah 1990) (state constitutional
analysis employed "to simplify ... the search
and seizure rules so that they can be more
easily followed by the police and the courts
and, at the same time, provide the public with
consistent and predictable protection against
unreasonable searches and seizures."). I would
probably prefer to hold that the rule of Terry
v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968), uniformly applied
by Utah courts, is a matter of Utah constitutional law that simply may not be balanced
away by any branch of our government and
that is not amenable to a roadblock exception.
Under established Utah decisional law, in
the absence of any individualized suspicion,
only a level one stop is permitted. E.g., State
v. Jackson, 149 Utah Adv. Rep. 64, 65 (Utah
Ct. App. 1990); State v. Menke, 787 P.2d 537,
570 (Utah Ct. App. 1990); State v. Trujillo,
739 P.2d 85, 87-88 (Utah Ct. App. 1987). A
level one stop is a purely voluntary encounter.
Id. And one does not lose the right to decline
to participate in a level one encounter simply
because one chooses to drive rather than to
~ ^ — ., cm/fh 781 P.2d 879, 881

other grounds, 153 Utah Adv. Rep. 8 (Utah
Feb. 7, 1991). See also, Delaware v. Prowse,
440 U.S. 648, 663 (1979) (persons do not lose
the protections of fourth amendment "when
they step from the sidewalk into their automobiles"); State v. Talbot, 789 P.2d 489, 491,
494 (Utah Ct. App. 1990).
If, as seems clear, the police cannot require
every pedestrian on a stretch of sidewalk to
stop and answer police inquiries, I am hardpressed to see how they can stop every car on
a stretch of the interstate highway and require
the driver to answer inquiries. In my view, the
only roadblock that is sure to pass state constitutional muster is one which would qualify
as a level-one stop. Cf. Little v. State, 300
Md. 485, 479 A.2d 903, 906 (1989) (roadblock
upheld where motorists avoiding roadblock or
otherwise refusing to cooperate not detained).
I see no constitutional problem with a roadside police checkpoint announced by a sign on
the freeway, "Police Roadblock Next Exit.
Your Cooperation in Answering Police Inquiries Appreciated." Most drivers would stop,
even though they could not be required to,
just as most pedestrians will stop and respond
to police inquiries on the sidewalk. But on
neither medium of travel can one suspected of
nothing illegal whatsoever be compelled to do
so.
Gregory K. Orme, Judge
1. Sergeant Mangelson's efforts to thwart illegal
drug trafficking are well known in Utah's appellate
courts. See, e.g., Arroyo, 796 P.2d 684 (reversing
State v. Arroyo, 770 P.2d 153 (Utah Ct. App.
1989)); State v. Earl, 716 P.2d 803 (Utah 1986); State
v. Baird, 763 P.2d 1214 (Utah Ct. App. 1988);
Stare v. Aquilar, 758 P.2d 457 (Utah Ct. App.
1988). See also United States v. Corral, 899 F.2d
991 (10th Cir. 1990). Besides the present case, at
least one other case involving an automobile search
by Sergeant Mangelson is pending in this court. Srare
v. Kitchen, No. 900307-CA. As a central
player in at least five published search and seizure
scenarios to date, the redoubtable trooper's notoriety is approaching that of Max 25, a narcotics
detection dog whose nose for crime has figured in at
least seven published federal cases in the District of
Columbia Circuit. See United States v. Colyer, 878
F.2d 469, 471 and n.2 (D.C. Cir. 1989), and cases
cited therein.
2. As indicated by the following exchange at the
suppression hearing, an affirmative answer to this
question could prompt Trooper Howard to then
seek consent to search automobiles without any
other suspicion of wrongdoing:
Q (Mr. Metos): Just out of curiosity,
did anybody answer "yes" [to query
about alcohol, weapons, or contraband]
when everything appeared in order so
you would have to conduct a further
search?
A (Trooper Howard): Yes. I've had
several people do that.
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3. Re-cross examination of Trooper Howard by
defense counsel included the following exchange:
Q: You had no reason to believe [Sims]
was doing anything wrong as he entered
the roadblock or breaking any law; is
that correct?
A: That's correct.
4. By thoroughly briefing state constitutional concerns in his argument, Sims has answered calls by
Utah's appellate courts for a state constitutional
analysis of search and seizure issues. See, e.g., Eari,
716 P.2d at 805-06; State v. Shamblin, 763 P.2d
425,426 n.2 (Utah Ct. App. 1988) (citing cases).
5. See, e.g., State v. Talbot, 792 P.2d 489 (Utah Ct.
App. 1990).
6. Under our characterization of this roadblock, it
does not fit into the traditional "three levels" of
Dolice stops, that have been described as follows:
(1) an officer may approach a citizen at
[any time] and pose questions so long as
the citizen is not detained against his
will; (2) an officer may seize a person if
the officer has an "articulable suspicion"
that the person has committed or is
about to commit a crime; however, the
"detention must be temporary and last
no longer than necessary to effectuate
the purpose of the stop"; (3) an officer
may arrest a suspect if the officer has
probable cause to believe an offense has
been committed or is being committed.
State v. Deitman, 739 P.2d 616, 617-18 (Utah
1987) (per curiam) (quoting United States v. Merritt,
736 F.2d 223, 230 (5th Cir. 1984), cert, denied, 476
U.S. 1142 (1986)). The level of individualized suspicion, i.e., none, is the same as with a level one
stop. However, since drivers were required to stop
and had no opportunity to decline to participate, the
roadblock stop went well beyond a level one encounter. It did not, however, qualify as a level two or
three stop, since no individualized suspicion prompted the stop.
7. This provision has been characterized as a legislatively enacted version of the so-called level two
stop. See State v. Menke, 787 P.2d 537, 541 (Utah
Ct. App. 1990); note 6 supra.
8. The court's definition of the public interest
pursued, i.e., detection of illegal drug trafficking,
appears to be contrary to testimony about the generalized purposes of the roadblock. There was no
finding as to the actual efficacy of the roadblock in
meeting the public purposes described by the officers or the more specific purposes identified by the
court.
9. While we understand that allowing large trucks to
bypass the roadblock may be necessary for safety's
sake, we wonder about the implications of this
procedure for effective drug interdiction. The procedure seems to invite drug traffickers to transport
their contraband in large trucks, and possibly relatively massive quantities, to avoid detection.
10. Compare United States v. Corral, 823 F.2d 1389
(10th Cir. 1987), upholding the constitutionality of a
roadblock for the purpose of checking driver's licenses, vehicle registration, and insurance, pursuant
only to the permission of a state police supervisor.
Corral does not cite Brown's requirement, adopted
in Sitz, of a plan explicitly limiting officer discretion. In view of the reiteration of that requirement
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we find in Sitz, we do not accept CorraTs implication that supervisory permission to conduct a roadblock constitutes an adequate "plan."
Corral was cited in United States v. McFayden,
865 F.2d 1306 (D.C. Cir. 1989), which, in turn, was
relied on by the trial court in holding the roadblock
in this case constitutional. McFayden involved
"traffic control" roadblocks set up to deal with
traffic congestion associated with street level drug
trafficking. The McFayden roadblocks were found
to pass the reasonableness balancing test of Brown.
Those roadblocks, again in contrast to the present
situation, were carried out pursuant to a coordinated plan developed by fwe District of Columbia
police districts.
11. A similar conclusion might well be reached by
viewing the roadblock as an "administrative search."
Supreme Court cases dealing with such searches
have focused on the balance between the need for
such searches and the fourth amendment values
implicated by such searches. However, the cases also
involved situations where the challenged search was,
at least arguably, authorized by statute or ordinance. See Colonnade Catering Corp. v. United
States, 397 U.S. 72 (1970) (federal statute); Camara
v. Municipal Court, 387 U.S. 523 (1967)(city
housing code); See v. City of Seattle, 387 U.S. 541
(1967) (city building code).
12. Our uncritical treatment of Sitz and other
federal cases should not be taken as approval of the
analysis employed, or result reached, in these cases.
We merely accede to the preeminent position of the
United States Supreme Court in construing the
United States Constitution.
13. Our analysis under the Utah constitution is
limited to the need for legislative authorization. We
note, however, that Justice Durham's opinion in
Larocco, requires both probable cause and exigent
circumstances to justify a warrantless search and
seizure under article I, section 14, which would seem
to prohibit this roadblock and others. However,
Larocco was a divided decision, with Justice Zimmerman concurring, Justice Stewart concurring in
result only, and Justices Hall and Howe dissenting.
The final verdict for Utah roadblocks is, therefore,
unknown.
14. Arguably, legislative enactment of Utah Code
Ann. §§77-7-15 (1990) and 41-l-17(c) (1988)
may reflect a determination by our legislature to not
simply ratify judicial expansion of police power by
silent acquiescence, but to determine through the
political process whether such expansion is to
become a part of Utah's law.
15. Indeed, in the case of port of entry stops, the
legislature appears to have weighed liberty concerns
with some care. Vehicles normally subject to these
stops are exempted from stopping if doing so would
increase their one-way trip distance by more than
three miles or five percent. Utah Code Ann. §2712-19.4 (1) and (3) (Supp. 1990).
16. In Pimental v. Dep*t of Transp., 561 A.2d 1348
(R.I. 1989), and Commonwealth v. Tarbert, 348 Pa.
Super. 306, 502 A.2d 221 (1985), the Rhode Island
Supreme Court and the Superior Court of Pennsylvania held sobriety checkpoints unconstitutional
under their state constitutions without considering
whether such practices could be valid if statutorily
authorized.
17. We note that the factors to be considered in
performing such balancing are myriad, complex,
and subject to debate. See, e.g., Sitz and dissenting
opinions of Brennan and Stevens, J J.; Nelson v.
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Lane County, 743 P.2d at 710-11 (appendix); see also
Davis & Wallentine, A Model for Analyzing the
Constitutionality of Sobriety Roadblock Stops in
Utah, 3 B.Y.U. J. Pub. L. 357 (1989). Political and
economic considerations that are the particular
province of the legislature may also come into play:
Utah's economy benefits greatly from tourism, and
the state is also currently attempting to attract the
Winter Olympic Games. Our legislators may well
wish to consider the possible impact of suspicionless
roadblocks upon visitors to our state.
18. It may be that lifestyle in the western states
promotes a greater expectation of privacy in our
automobiles than in other states or in the United
States Supreme Court's enunciation of the
"automobile exception* under the fourth amendment. See California v. Carney, 471 U.S. 386
(1985).
19. We note that in Brown, an interval of less than
two hours between an illegal arrest and the obtaining of an incriminating statement from the arrestee
was viewed as insufficient to attenuate the statement
from the arrest. 422 U.S. at 604.
20. Additionally, Trooper Howard testified that,
once the open container was discovered, Sims was,
in fact, not free to leave, but was subject to citation
and to field sobriety testing.
21. By contrast, in Brown v. Illinois, the Supreme
Court seems to have regarded an illegal arrest, that
appeared "calculated to cause surprise, fright, and
confusion," 422 U.S. at 605, as a causative factor
producing the arrestee's subsequent incriminating
statements.

